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INTRODUCTION 
This contribution analyses the use of third-party services by media websites in 39 European 
countries before and after the introduction of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(hereafter: GDPR) May 25, 2018 as an inroad to discuss the legal versus ethical obligations 
of legacy broadcast media with regards to audiences’ privacy and the impact on the key 
value of trust in media. 
The media ecosystem appears in a never-ending state of flux, following ongoing 
technological, economic and socio-cultural developments. Especially the move to web-based 
media services, including social media, have pushed legacy media and law and policy 
makers to keep up. Recent years have seen them struggling with issues revolving around 
technological innovations that provide media with new opportunities for content creation and 
dissemination as well as for audience relations but that come with their own set of legal and 
ethical issues (Van den Bulck et al., 2018a). This is especially relevant for public service 
media (PSM), that are expected to maintain particular standards and values in return for 
their continued existence and that do not easily fit the new media reality. For one, 
diversifying audience behaviour requires new ways to track their movements and, thus, to 
reach and retain them. Efforts to do so are part and parcel of the so-called datafication of the 
media-ecology whereby all online human action (clicks, likes, survey results) is tracked and 
translated into quantified and quantifiable ‘big data’ (Mayer-Schoenberger & Cukier, 2013, 
Van Dijck, 2014). To help their internet-based content reach audiences, media collaborate 
with outside parties: when a user loads a webpage, a number of external services are 
contacted, triggered by scripts embedded in the received webpage or in other scripts. Such 
'third-party' services range from helping editors, marketing people, media researchers and 
PSM managers to analyse user behaviour; providing technical help, for instance with the 
distribution of heavy data like video streams; showing content from social media or 
advertising. 
These developments have created shifts in legacy media’s value chains and 
business models (Raats et al., 2015; Donders & Van den Bulck, 1016; Donders et al., 2018.) 
and raise important ethical and legal questions as, potentially, these third parties can identify 
users and collect user data that are of use to these media but are also tradeable, i.e. of 
interest to other parties. This creates potential threats to citizens’ rights leading to 
discussions about privacy and surveillance (Srnicek, 2017; Zuboff, 2019). This is a concern 
for all media as their success and survival relies on maintaining respectful relations with their 
audiences. However, it is of particular relevance to PSM, the raison d’être of which is based 
in their role and position as trusted institutions (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018). Law and policy 
makers, from their end, have been trying to deal with these issues of privacy and 
surveillance as, increasingly, critical voices speak up, demanding action. The most forcible 
reaction to date has come from the European Union who has stepped in with its General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In force since 25 May 2018, GDPR deals with the third-
party servers (represented by URLs) that play a role in compiling a webpage presented to 
the user and aims to provide extended rights to users to protect personal information by 
giving users more control over the collection and distribution of their personal information, 
also on websites. GDPR forces every website provider serving users from the EU to review 
their use of cookies and other person identifiable data exchange with third parties. The 
assumption in the industry was that GDPR would lead website providers to review and 
reduce the number of third party servers (Reseke, 2018), while legal experts suggest that 
the principles of purpose limitation as well as retention minimization inherent in GDPR may, 
in fact, enable so-called Big Data (Mayer-Schönberger & Pandova, 2016). This results in our 
broad research question: Do (legacy) media audiences meet fewer third party servers when 
accessing their digital offerings than before GDPR? 
Beyond this legal question, though, the issue involves an ethical principle. As 
audiences, citizens, civil society and policy makers voice concerns, much of the public and 
political outcry has been focusing on large social media and digital giants like Facebook and 
Alphabet, with eye catching cases such as Cambridge Analytics paving the way. However, 
notions of ethics extend to broadcast and other (legacy) media, especially PSM. For 
instance, where print and, especially, free to air broadcast media mainly had anonymous 
listeners and viewers, online media can - per definition - not avoid knowing their audience, at 
least at the very basic level of the users’ IP-addresses contacting the server of the media 
website. The technical structure of web communication invites for a much more detailed 
study of users, dissolving the original anonymity associated with broadcasting. This creates 
two problem areas for legacy broadcast media, especially PSM.  
One potential problem area relates to media respecting their audience’s privacy, as 
tracking and data mining can occur without users’ knowledge, infringing their privacy. This is 
of particular relevance to PSM as their brand identity and reputation (and public financing), 
to a large extent, are based in a role and position as ‘trusted institutions’. Different from the 
audience anonymity in broadcasting, for interactive digital platforms, the burden of 
demonstrating integrity and independence falls back on the PSM organisations, in terms of 
ensuring the anonymity of users and their browsing behaviour in relation to external ‘third-
party’ web services.    
The other area of concern legacy broadcast media’s relationship to online 
advertising. Advertisers have come to expect state-of-the-art segmentation of users to 
ensure the highest possible impact of the advertising messages, making so-called 
‘programmatic advertising’ (Busch, 2018) the dominant type of interactive advertising. 
However, this requires advertising technology such as user-tracking across platforms; user 
interest profiling; browsing history analysis for advertising retargeting and ‘intention to buy’ 
calculations for advertising price setting. As a result, web browsing has evolved into a 
complex interaction between, often, hundreds of servers each time a user visits a page. The 
question is whether legacy broadcast media are vigilant in their use of third party services 
and whether GDPR has worked as a wake-up call for all legacy and especially public service 
media. This is of particular relevance for PSM as it involves their relationship to commercial 
revenue, in most countries a debated and regulated issue. 
  
To this end, after this introduction, this contribution first develops in a theoretical 
framework that combines an understanding of general principles of and existing research 
into third party server use with conceptual insights into the relationship between the legal 
and the ethical, based in two complementary theoretical perspectives: media values, 
especially PSM values, and computer ethics. Next, turning to the empirical section, we 
discusses the methodological set-up of our data collection and analysis. Subsequently, the 
results section discusses occurrences and distribution of TP URLs across various 
categorisations, i.e. according to different media and different types of third party 
servers.Cluster analysis reveals four clusters of media according to number and types of 
third parties involved.Crucially, the result sections compares these data before and after the 
introduction of GDPR. Finally, the conclusion reflects on these results in light of the 
theoretical framework, weighing legal versus ethical consideration in how media deal with 
third party servers, and zooming in on the implications for media, especially PSM.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Third-party servers on media content websites 
Attention grabbing cases such as the Snowden revelations and Cambridge Analytics as well 
as more critical voices warning for hypes such as FaceApp that creates an image of your 
older self in return for your data, have brought to the general attention the widespread use 
and pitfalls of third-party servers in Big Data, now part and parcel of our online behaviour 
(Lyon, 2014; Dolata, 2017). Third-party servers (represented by URLs) play different roles in 
compiling the webpage presented to the user: some deliver videos, images or sound 
streaming, others give technical resources like computer code to build webpages. We focus 
on third-party servers that track, collect and analyse user behaviour to report site traffic to 
editors or to optimize exposure to content and advertising. Advertising-related third-party 
servers are a booming industry, delivering advertising banners, video and native advertising; 
segment and profile users by tracking them across platforms; auction personalized web 
advertisement slots to advertisers; and ‘retarget’, i.e. show the user a ‘reminder 
advertisement’ from a previously visited website. To refine their services, they subject large 
amounts of user data to advanced, artificial intelligence-based analysis to predict future 
behaviour like buying intention or to describe interests in narrow user segments. The more 
precise the description of a user, the higher the potential value of an advertising 
slot/inventory (Turow, 2011). The monetary value hereof is significant. In 2018, online 
advertising for 27 countries in Europe (incl. Russia and Turkey), was a €55.1 billion business 
- compared to €34.0 billion on TV ads and €23.3 billion on print media ads (IAB Europe, 
2019) – and $107.5 in the US, up from 88 billion in 2017 (IAB, 218a). Typically, data 
management platforms offer user data for a price to other actors. Information regarding the 
value of user profile information is hard to obtain, but in 2009 the price of a targeted ad was 
2.68 times the price of an untargeted ad (Beales, 2010, cited by Acquisti, Taylor and 
Wagman, 2016: 24). 
 
Research into third-party servers 
The activity of third-party servers has caught researchers’ interest. Some authors 
(Falahrastegar et al., 2014; Wambach and Bräunlich, 2017) focus on the technologies that 
identify users in the browser from one website visit to the next, either through 'cookies' 
(Internet Engineering Task Force, 2011) or through so-called ‘finger-printing’ technologies 
that identify users across devices without cookies (Acar et al., 2014). Other studies map and 
categorise which third-party sites are contacted when users visit webpages. For instance, 
using automatic scripts, Englehardt and Narayanan (2016) analysed the one million most 
popular websites in the world in 2016. Visiting the pages 90 million times in one month, they 
found 81.000 different third-party URLs, yet only 123 were present at more than one per cent 
of the websites. Their study further showed that news websites have the highest average 
number of third-party URLs, while government, non-profit and university organizations’ 
websites have the lowest number. A study (Sørensen & Van den Bulck, 2018) comparing 
unique URLs found on PSM and commercial broadcast media’s web pages during 6 visits 
between December 2016 and August 2017, i.e. before GDPR, showed an average of 42,95 
third-party URLs among private media compared to 70,42 for PSM with advertisements, 
37,60 for PSM with possibility for advertisements, and 17,33 for PSM not allowed to display 
commercial advertisements. While low numbers of third-party URLs for PSM could be 
related to a ban on commercial advertisements, private media, too, showed considerable 
variation with a span between eight and 88 unique third party servers. The current study 
wants to find out 1) if these comparisons between various types of legacy broadcast media 
hold and 2) whether GDPR has affected the presence of third-party servers.  
Other studies have focused on understanding the ownership and type of these third-
party servers. Lindskow (2016) mappeds the business network of 41 US media publishers 
and finds 1356 business partners involved in building web pages for users, concluding that 
traditional news media webpage production involves a huge network of interacting 
companies. Kammer’s (forthcoming) analysis of the use of third-party trackers by a sample 
of 25 news apps of legacy media suggests a divergent yet wide range of trackers as well as 
an increase in extent and complexity of the network over time but also shows that behind 
this wide variety of tracking services are a smaller group of dominant players, such as 
Alphabet. Our study identifies, maps and analyses the third-party servers on commercial 
broadcast media and PSM websites , with a focus on advertising, before and after GDPR. 
To understand the relevance of our research questions, we build a theoretical framework 
around PSM, third-party servers, privacy and trust. 
 
Protecting privacy: from the legal to the ethical 
The privacy concerns involved in the use of third-party trackers has received considerable 
attention from law and policy makers, looking to protect personal identifiable information (pii) 
and privacy in general. National law and policy makers, however, are hampered in their 
response options on account of the dominance of neo-liberal and free speech paradigms 
(Van Dijck, 2014), a lack of technological understanding of the issues at hand (Van den 
Bulck et al., 2018a), and, most of all, limited options to tackle global companies that escape 
the grasp of any national control (Vaidhyanathan, 2018). Instead, the EU has taken the lead, 
defining requirements for providers of interactive services regarding personal data protection 
and obtaining users' consent about data collection (EU Parliament, 2002; The EU Internet 
Handbook, 2016). However, abovementioned cookie-less 'fingerprinting' technologies were 
not mentioned in the 2002 EU regulation (Directive 2002/58/EC) resulting in the EU 
developing its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in force since 25 May 2018. 
GDPR provides extended rights to users to protect personal information, including the right 
to be informed about the processing of pii, and the right-to-be-forgotten, i.e. have all pii 
removed from the provider’s records. 
However, collecting user data involves more fundamental ethical questions. Indeed, 
data collection can be lawful but can still be at odds with ethic principles of good behaviour 
towards end users. A key issue in this revolves around who exactly is expected to be 
ethical? Is it restricted to third party tracker services themselves or also the media that use 
them? Much discussion recently revolves around the ethical role of tech and social media 
giants such as Facebook, as the size and power of these companies escapes control. A 
good illustration hereof is the 2019 FTC fine of $5 billion for Facebook’s violation of various 
privacy rules. While this amounts to the highest fine in FTC’s history, the number is dwarfed 
by Facebook’s $15 billion revenue in the Spring quarter of 2019 and its $22 billion profit in 
2018. In a cynical turn of events, the fine resulted in Facebook’s stock prices going up 
(Patel, 2019). This relative inability, in most legal contexts combined with a strong 
reluctance, to regulate and curb these Tech Giants, has resulted in law and policymakers 
appealing to these companies’ ethical awareness. As Wagner (2018:1) suggests, though, in 
this context, ‘”ethics” is the new “industry self-regulation”’ with government regulation 
considered as part of the problem rather than the solution and Tech Giants turning to ethics 
as a catch-all phrase and a means ‘to be seen to be doing it’. 
Far less discussed, though, is the ethical behaviour of legacy media, both private and 
PSM. Indeed, data collection may be lawful but can still be at odds with the responsibility of 
legacy media towards its users, especially, PSM institutions that are considered and have an 
obligation as so-called ‘islands of trust’. This has two complementary theoretical 
perspectives: media values, especially PSM values, and computer ethics. The latter offers 
analytical tools to expand analysis of data collection beyond privacy to include trust and 
security. Moor (1997) considers digital data as 'greased information': once information 
becomes a digital signal, it becomes unstoppable, beyond the grasp of an individual, 
organization or business. This has implications for privacy and security. For authors like 
Moor (1997), privacy is not a legal or philosophical issue in its own right but is instrumental 
to the core human value of security. For individuals and societies to function, not everybody 
should know everything. As such, Moore worries more about the potential than the actual 
harm that greased information poses to personal security. In contrast, authors like 
Thompson (2001) see privacy as a risk function of exposing information: for each item of 
information disclosed, potential privacy consequences can be estimated. 
Data collection and analysis also have ethical implications for the individual in 
relationship to society, i.e. to individual agency and freedom. Brey (2005) discusses how 
decisions taken by algorithms based on user data may not empower the user, but rather, 
remove agency by making assumptions, by not providing opportunities to correct wrong 
assumptions and by serving companies instead of user interests. Similarly, Vedder (1999) 
argues that algorithmic systems that use aggregated data covering many users, like a credit-
scoring system for bank loans, de-individualizes citizens. Without individual assessment, a 
decision cannot be fair. Bozdag (2013) further shows that algorithmic recommendation 
systems, e.g. for media content, are biased, i.e. reflect specific ethical values. These issues 
raised by computer ethics are important to our research question, since user data collection 
and analysis form the basis for ‘calculated public spheres’ (Birkbak and Carlsen, 2016; 
Harper, 2016), extending the issue to the relationship between legacy broadcast media and 
algorithms (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018). 
 
(Legacy) Media, Trust and the PSM Conundrum 
The issue is also relevant from the point of view of key values of (legacy) media and of PSM 
in particular. Traditional, media have been considered as cornerstones of democracy 
through the creation of a public sphere, the fourth estate watchdog of government and 
corporate power. As a result, the media were a place of trust, where people could turn to in 
the conviction that these media had their best interests as citizens at heart, even in 
commercial media systems and with varying journalistic and entertainment values. In return, 
and for a very long time, at least in the US and Europe, people showed great trust in ‘the 
media’. While a slow decline has been going on for over a decade, more recently this rust 
can no longer be taken for granted, following a range of trends including tabloidization, 
personalization and recent developments such as the upsearch in dis- and misinformation  
(Jones, 2018, Stoll, 2019). Issues relating to privacy could further undermine this trust, a key 
reason for survival in a media market in decline (van der Burg & Van den Bulck, 2017). 
These issues are of particular relevance to PSM as they differ from other media in 
that governments and societies expect a commitment to ensure universality, contribute to 
identity and social cohesion, and provide a mix of information, inspiration and entertainment, 
while maintaining high levels of trustworthiness (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018). Always 
intrinsic but implicit in PSM ideals, from the 1990s onwards, trust became an explicit topic in 
legitimating its relevance as PSM institutions’ fought fierce commercial competition and 
‘hostile’ governments. The European Broadcasting Union’s (EBU) - PSM institutions 
representative and lobby organization - Digital Strategy Group (2002) identified the PSM 
institution as an ‘island of trust’ amidst an increasingly commercial and self-serving 
ecosystem (Bardoel and d’Haenens, 2008). Biltereyst (2004: 341) calls it the ‘aura of trust’ 
that ‘includes a feeling of quality, reliability, honesty, competence and good intentions’. 
Research confirms that in countries with strong PSM, trust in radio and television 
broadcasting is stronger (EBU, 2017). At the same time, to remain relevant, PSM 
institutions, too, need to engage with digital developments, including the use of third party 
trackers, to remain relevant in a media-ecosystem increasingly dominated by digital 
platforms and personalized services and, thus, influenced by algorithms and big data. While 
this helps to better serve the citizen/user, it can contribute to an economy of user data that 
may be of little benefit to the institution or the citizens, and that may challenge PSM’s core 
values. This tension reverberates the classic challenge for PSM, suspended between 
reaching audiences with interesting content in a crowded environment and providing ‘added 
public value’ to users-as-citizens, away from commercial pressures. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL SET-UP 
To understand the use of third party trackers by private and public service media before and 
after GDPR, to analyse relevant differences between media types and to get a better 
understanding of the types and ownership of these services, we followed a procedure tested 
in previous research (Sørensen & Van den Bulck, 2018). As such, our data result from an 
extensive and repeated collecting of third party traffic on media-related websites. From a 
dataset of +32 million recordings of HTTP responses from servers for files like pictures, code 
or text to +12700 web pages from 1250 websites visited 9 times before (from 2018-02-05 to 
2018-05-05) and 24 times after GDPR (from 2018-05-25 to 2019-04-12), we selected 348 
media websites from 39 European countries (#113 from EBU members, #235 from private 
media), see (Sørensen and Kosta, 2019). We analysed the presence of third party URLs (in 
the following ‘TP URLs’) in our browser at the level of HTTP responses, including the many 
different page elements, e.g. scripts, pictures, fonts, videos that are used to build a webpage 
in the user’s browser. We can thus determine the percentage of page elements that are 
delivered from other sites (‘third-party servers’) than the media website that we visited. 
Furthermore, for each site we visited, we can count how many different TP URLs we meet 
while browsing the site. In order to imitate normal user’s browsing behaviour on a media site, 
we have visited 10 randomly chosen pages from each media site. The visited pages 
remained the same throughout all our 33 visits. We found 3256 unique TP URLs, for 1517 of 
which we could identify the company.  
As TP URLs serve many different purposes, such as content delivery, analytics, 
advertising, amongst others (see above), we manually visiting each TP URL that appears at 
more than one of the visited sites and evaluated the purpose of the third party interaction by 
reading third party website descriptions of the services offered by the third party company. 
This was supplemented by looking up identified TP URLs in databases, such as WhoIs 
(https://www.whois.com, accessed 2019-06-01) and Threatcrowd.org, accessed 2019-06-
15). Coding the purpose of the TP URLs in a multi-stage coding process, we defined 16 
categories: Advertising, Analytics, Content, Cybersecurity, Distribution technology, Editorial, 
Malicious, Plug-in, Privacy, Programming, Publisher, Retail, Search engine, Social media, 
Unidentifiable and Specific to a certain media site - not categorized (see appendix 1). URLs 
that only appear at one site has not been categorized. 
Analysing the media sites, one main distinction we used is between privately owned 
media websites, and media websites offered by PSM organisations (in this case, all 
members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Although we have a few media 
websites from countries outside Europe, in this analysis we focus on media websites from 
European countries (either in- or outside EU/EEA). Media websites were categorized  in two 
further ways to find patterns that cut across the private/public distinction. One, is to look at 
the number of unique TP URLs found at each site in relation to the ratio of page elements 
from TP servers. In this way we get a plot with x- and y- axis. We have indexed the number 
of unique TP URLs so the site with the highest number (bfmtv.com from France) is 
represented with 1, and all other sites a fraction of 1. This plot can be seen in Figure 01: 
 
 
Figure 1: # unique TP URLs found at each site in relation to the ratio of page elements from 
TP servers for four types of media, 
Beside that, we look at the distribution of TP URLs across the above-mentioned 
categories of TP services. To identify media sites that have similar patterns in the distribution 
across the different types of TP services, we used a clustering software (‘Rapidminer’) to 
identify clusters of media websites. To prepare values between 0 and 1, needed for the 
clustering, the number of TP URLs for each site and TP-category were divided by the total 
number of found TP URLs. Subsequently, using X-means and Euclidean distance for the 
calculation, four clusters were found. In the analysis we will discuss the characteristics of 
these clusters. 
As our measurements span over a long period of time that includes an event 
(introduction GDPR) assumed to impact on third party activity on webpages, we present 
diagrams that depict developments over time. The many dimensions of the data and 
calculations allow for a wide range of possible analysis and visualisations, only a few of 
which we can discuss in the scope of this contribution. 
  
RESULTS / ANALYSIS 
Occurrences and distribution of TP URLs across various categorisations 
Across the 33 visits, we found 3256 unique TP URLs, spread into 2944 unique TP URLs for 
the 235 private media sites and 1013 for the 113 public media sites. Analysing over time, 
Figure 2 shows a dramatic drop in number of unique TP URLs between May 5, 2018 and 
May 29, 2018 for private media, while PSM sites show a slower decline.  
 
Figure 2: evolution of TP URLs over time for four types of media 
 
PSM where advertising is forbidden have the lowest level of unique TP URLs per site and 
visit, confirming earlier research results (Sorensen & Van den Bulck, 2018). Furthermore, it 
is clear that fluctuations occur for all types of websites, reflecting the dynamic nature of 
webpage production characterised by rapid introduction of new technologies and change of 
suppliers of web services, amongst others. 
 Beyond that, results presented in Figure 3 show that the number of different TP 
URLs for each of our visits declined over time.  
 
 
Figure 3: number of distinct TP URLs over time for four types of media 
 
For PSM sites where advertising is either forbidden or not seen by us, the total number of 
different TP URLs fluctuate between 88 to 141 (PSM advertising not seen) and 130 to 156 
(PSM advertising forbidden), although the overall decline is negligible.  
In Figure 4, we compare our first nine measurements / visits to media sites, which 
took place before May 25, 2018, with the last nine measurements / visits (November 7, 2018 
to April 12, 2019).  
 
Figure 4: average % of TP URLs by type of servers pre and post GDPR 
 
Figure 4 shows the share of the different TP URLs categories in two time-intervals 
respectively before and after GDPR. Marked decrease in occurrences can be observed for 
Advertising TP URLs and, to a lesser extent, for Analytics and Social Media (except on 
Private Media sites). Conversely, a marked increase can be observed for the category of 
Distribution technology for PSM sites where no advertising was observed. In volume, the 
average number of TP URLs declines for most categories of TP URLs and on most types of 
media sites in the nine post GDPR measurements. Growth appears however for some TP 
URLs categories on some types of sites: For PSM sites not allowed to carry advertising: 
Content (32%), Distribution technology (13%), Publisher (11%), Search engine (56%) and 
Unidentifiable (+22%); for PSM sites allowed to carry advertising: Programming (14%), 
Publisher (2%), Search engine (6%) and TP URLs that only occur on one site (31%); for 
PSM site where no advertising was observed: Distribution technology (+54%), Programming 
(+4%) and Unidentifiable (+48%); and, finally, for private media: Programming (+21%) and 
Unidentifiable (+24%). Figure 5 provides further details.  
 
Figure 5: Evolution in types of TP URLs before and after GDPR by four types of media 
 
If we look at the plot of the sites in relation to their use of external servers to produce the 
webpage (the HTTP-ratio) and their indexed number of TP URLs, depicted in figure 1 (see 
earlier), we see that most PSM sites that are not allowed to carry advertising both have a low 
number of unique TP URLs and produce the web pages with own servers. these PSM sites  
have a lot in common.  
Conversely, many private media have a high ratio of unique TP URLs and produce 
their web pages using many different third party servers. Interesting, sites from PSM that are 
allowed to carry advertising (circled in red), to a certain degree, follow the patterns of private 
media rather than that of the other PSM sites. Furthermore, the plot shows a diversity within 
private media sites. Upper right corner contains sites with a relatively high number of 
different third party URLs and a high ratio of page elements (represented by HTTP 
responses) from third party servers. 
 
Media Clustering beyond the Public-Private division 
Using data mining software we aimed at identifying groups of media sites not defined by 
being private or public, but by the characteristics of the type of TP URLs that users meet 
when visiting the media pages. Running an X-means clustering algorithm on data of the 
number of TP URLs for each site distributed over the 16 categories of TP URLs purposes 
(see above) the software revealed four clusters, as presented in Table 1. 
 
 No of sites Private 
media 
All PSM 
sites 
PSM 
Advertising 
forbidden 
PSM 
Advertising 
not seen 
PSM 
Advertising 
allowed 
Cluster 0 115 79 36 5 3 28 
Cluster 1 86 26 60 31 9 20 
Cluster 2 41 38 3 0 0 3 
Cluster 3 101 88 13 1 1 11 
Table 1:  X-means clusters based on # TP URLs for each site distributed over the 16 
categories of TP URLs purposes 
 
Cluster 0 is mainly (68%) composed of Private sites, mostly (72%) from the EU, while 
it also has the second highest share of non-EU sites. Advertising TP URLs comprise 36% of 
all TP URLs, followed by 14% Analytics, Social Media 11%. This cluster has 1247 unique TP 
URLs  of which 458 Advertising-related, 76 Analytics-related, 20 Malicious and 108 
Unidentifiable. 
Cluster 1 is composed mainly (70%) of PSM sites, with slightly more sites where 
advertising is forbidden (31) than possible (20). In this cluster, 86% of sites are from the EU. 
Advertising TP URLs comprise 28% of all TP URLs, Analytics 20%, Distribution technology 
and Publisher each 11%. The Cluster presented 611 unique  TP URLs, of which 201 
Advertising-related, 8 Malicious and 35 Unidentifiable. 
Cluster 2 is clearly dominated (92%) by private media with only 3 PSM sites all on 
which advertising is allowed. Cluster 2 has, with 24%, the highest share of non-EU sites. 
More than 50% of the third party URLs in Cluster 2 are Advertising-related, while Analytics 
constitute 8% and Distribution technology 9%. Cluster 2 has 1647 unique TP URLs, of which 
595 are Advertising-related, 37 Malicious and 117 Unidentifiable. 
Cluster 3 is dominated by private media (87%), accompanied by 12% PSM sites, of 
which 11 are PSM where advertising is allowed, and one each of the other types of PSM 
sites. Cluster 3 has the lowest share of non-EU sites. Advertising TP URLs comprise 47% of 
all TP URLs, Analytics 11%, Distribution technology 9%. The cluster has 1727 unique TP 
URLs, of which 665 are Advertising-related, 22 Malicious and 142 Unidentifiable. 
Analysing the presence of TP categories in the different clusters, Cluster 1 stands out 
as the one with the lowest number of unique advertising-related TPs and very few malicious 
and unidentifiable TPs. It also has in general the lowest number of different TP URLs, which 
can produce the preliminary conclusion that users that visit sites belonging to Cluster 1 
expose their data privacy to a lesser degree than in the case of the other clusters. The 
distribution of third parties in categories is provided in Figure 6  
 
Figure 6: Occurence (in %) of types of third party servers by cluster 
 
Companies in the clusters 
FInally, we want to shed some light on the main players in this field of third party services. In 
light of wider developments in digital media and technology, it is not very surprising that 
these services are dominated by the big tech giants. TP URLs from Google are present at 
31% of the pages, from Facebook at 7% of pages. The Top-20 that excludes Google and 
Facebook shows the major third party companies are not equally well represented in all four 
clusters. Cluster1, characterized by a high number of PSM sites, is interesting as Comscore 
(analytics), Chartbeat (editorial), New Relic (analytics) and - to a smaller extent - Twitter and 
hotjar (analytics) are more present in this than in the other clusters. Figure 7 presents the top 
20 third party companies. 
 
 
 
figure 7: Top 20 Companies of third party services by cluster 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our data show that media websites include scripts that contact third-party servers, albeit to 
different degrees. Before drawing conclusions, we note that the number of different third-
party URLs must be interpreted with care. For one, the same third-party company can be 
present through several server names, which can account for unidentifiable and technical 
third-party servers. Conversely, Englehardt and Narayanan (2016) and Lindskow (2016) 
show that the number of new third-party servers increase with additional visits so while we 
visited the sites repeatedly before and after GDPR, results are still influenced by the number 
of iterations. Furthermore, not all third parties are equally influential or important in the 
question of pii user data, so a particular website may have a low number of third party URLs 
but these can be very influential third-party services like Google or Facebook. Moreover, if a 
third party is present on several web pages, the description of the user is more precise and, 
thus, more valuable to advertisers. Overall, the size of our data may be affected by the 
number of visits, but our data represent all possible third parties a user can encounter. 
Indeed, our analysis shows that many third-party servers are programmatic, i.e. triggered by 
embedded scripts that depend on a user's browser history (cookies), device history 
(fingerprinting), location (geo-location), match with existing user-profile data e.g. from social 
networks, or wrapped scripts in scripts. 
When analysing the PSM websites, we see certain public service media 
organisations keep the involvement of third-party servers at a very low level. However, other 
PSM media - particularly those that show advertising on their websites or are allowed to do 
so - have a much higher level of different third party servers, and these also in many cases 
play a bigger role for composing the webpage. There is however a good explanation to the 
larger numbers of third party servers at pages with advertising - the process of selling 
advertising to advertisers involves a number of servers, just to find the right bid and buyer for 
the advertisement. However, as the bidding technology used for the sale of online 
advertising is currently at many websites being replaced with a system where bidden takes 
place not in the user’s computer, but between the media server and the advertising servers 
(so-called ‘server-side header bidding’ - see IAB, 2018a), the general decline we see in the 
number of third party servers may not necessarily reflect a lower exposure of user data, just 
that we cannot measure it any longer. That said, our impression is that GDPR led media 
publishers and advertising technology companies to clean up some unused servers and 
scripts and thereby also reduce the exposure of user data. But as we see when we look at 
development in other categories of third party servers, the general tendency goes in the 
direction of media websites to a greater extent using external web services for delivering the 
content and analysing the user behavior.  
GDPR has initiated a process of regulation that has resulted in a formalisation 
between the web partners involved in the production of the media web pages. However, it is 
too early to conclude that GDPR has led to less exposure of user data. Rather GDPR may 
have resulted in a concentration of fewer third party service providers, with a few very strong 
ones among those that have gained from GDPR. Our clustering analysis shows that the 
media websites are heterogeneous in their use of third party services. 
Our results illustrate what we consider to be a PSM dilemma. Our data confirm 
Lindskow’s  observation (2016; 2017) regarding news webpages in the US and Denmark for 
a wide sample of PSM. Many PSM organizations are clearly deeply integrated in 
international networks when delivering their webpages, interacting with an extensive network 
of digital business partners that aggregate content, analyse user behaviour, sell or buy 
advertisements, integrate social media or simply deliver files and scripts. This helps PSM 
organizations to optimize editorial work and (where allowed) advertising revenue, and to 
develop personalized recommendations for its users. It further allows PSM to keep up-to-
date with the newest technologies, platforms and user interfaces, and to reduce the need for 
PSM to invest in technology. The introduction of GDPR affected the number of these third 
party trackers to a relatively limited extend, suggesting that the introduction of such a legal 
framework does not change the core issue of media users being tracked. This comes at the 
price of dependency on (commercial) outsiders in content production and dissemination. 
PSM thus find themselves caught up in a dilemma between maintaining their integrity or 
participating in the exposure economy increasingly managed by international companies. 
Google and Facebook may be the best-known examples of the latter, but our research 
shows that they are just the most visible among hundreds of companies in the business of 
user data. 
  This dilemma can be considered as an ethical issue for PSM and policy makers: Can 
PSM organizations use the same tools as commercial media as freely as commercial media 
to monitor and optimize attention - tools that operate in the background without the 
knowledge of the user? Some arguments in favour include the need for PSM to be 
competitive with commercial media, to maintain relevance for users and to produce value for 
licence-free/public funding. However, as trusted institutions, PSM organizations have an 
ethical obligation to be honest and transparent in their mode of operation. If nothing else, 
opaque use of third-party servers undermines their very role as ‘islands of trust’, an 
important legitimation of their funding and existence. 
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Appendix 1 TP URLs typology 
 
The Advertising category encompases services related to the sale of ads and analysis of 
user profiles. From descriptions on websites presenting third-party services we have 
included Programmatic advertising services, Personalization services, Recommender 
systems, Real-time bidding platforms, Demand-side and Sell- side platforms, Data 
management platforms and data inte- gration, Data brokers and data trading, Re-targeting 
systems, User trackers, Ad-servers, Advertising agencies, Ad verification systems, Brand-
integrity, attribution and anti- fraud systems, Marketing automation, Content & native 
advertising services, Cross-device user identification, and Video-based advertising in the 
category. 
Analytics contains services used to understand user behavior and gather user 
feedback: Audience measurement, AI-powered analysis of user behavior, Audience 
Intelligence, Semantic profiling, Audience research (qualitative), Customerflow, Marketing 
analytics, Quality of Service monitoring and Web performance optimization, Attention 
optimization tools for Publishers, and Customer feedback. 
Content includes all types of elements shown on the web page, not being advertising. 
That includes content embedded from other websites, not part of the media 
company/organization. 
Cybersecurity contains services that perform internet infrastructure surveillance. 
Distribution technology includes content delivery networks, cloud services, and 
streaming services. 
Editorial contains services aimed at editors, e.g. recommender systems designed for 
publishers. 
Malicious are servers / URLs that could not be identified, but when examined in the 
cybersecurity community Threatcrowd - https://www.threatcrowd.org were voted as 
‘Malicious’ by the users. 
Plug-in contains web services that integrate content from other services into the 
visited site. 
Privacy contains services that monitor website compliance with GDPR and cookie 
use on the visited site. 
 Programming contains scripts, fonts and other tools rendering the webpage. 
Publisher are servers that are owned by visited media organizations including 
collaborating media organizations. 
Retail includes all-purpose web-portals, job-seeking portals, shopping platforms, real-
estate brokers, and consumer products (advertisers). 
Unidentifiable are URLs that do not return a readable HTML page, but a 404 
message, a blank page, a time-out or an access forbidden message. 
 
 
 
